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The House of Representatives was designed to expand alongside the country’s
population—yet its membership stopped growing a century ago. Larger and, in
some cases, unequal sized congressional districts have left Americans with
worse representation, including in the Electoral College, which allocates electors
partially on the size of states’ House delegations. This report recommends tying
the House’s size to the cube root of the nation’s population, which would lead to
141 more seats. It also calls for an approach to drawing districts that would
eliminate gerrymandering.
This report was researched and written during the 2018-2019 academic year by
students in Fordham Law School’s Democracy and the Constitution Clinic, which
is focused on developing non-partisan recommendations to strengthen the
nation’s institutions and its democracy. The clinic's reports are available
at law.fordham.edu/democracyreports.
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Why the House of Representatives Must Be Expanded

Executive Summary
The House of Representatives is not functioning how the
Constitution’s framers intended. To ensure that the body
provides fair and democratic representation, the size of the
House must expand and a new approach should be used for
drawing congressional districts.
Other than setting a minimum of at least 65 representatives
and requiring that each state have at least one, the Constitution
does not specify a size for the House. But the framers intended
for the size to increase alongside the country’s population,
which essentially happened until 1910.
In 1910, Congress approved a reapportionment of House
seats and an increase in the size of the House to 433.
The membership was further increased to 435 in 1912 to
accommodate the entry of Arizona and New Mexico as
states. However, Congress was unable to pass legislation
reapportioning the House in 1920. Congress finally passed new
legislation in 1929, but it froze the size of the House at 435.
That number, however, was an arbitrary cap. In the interest of
political expediency, those members who voted for the limit
forced their successors to represent two to three times as many
constituents as they themselves represented. The cap of 435
members still exists today, and it creates a host of problems for
our representative democracy.
An expansion of the House is important for several reasons.
First, each member of the House represents—on average—
about 750,000 constituents. In 2050, it is projected that each
member of Congress will represent a million or more people.
Everything a congressperson does will become even more
challenging. Some responsibilities might be entirely neglected.
Americans who depend on their representatives for help will
be one of a million. Second, the 435-member cap creates
unequal representation among districts. That district sizes
vary so greatly throughout the country is problematic—the
quality of representation Americans receive in the House
should not depend on the district in which they reside. This
disparity extends to presidential elections because the number
of electors that each state receives in the Electoral College is
the total of its representation in the House and Senate. Third,
increasing the size of the House may, in fact, help to fix the
issue of partisan gerrymandering. The more districts there are,
the harder it becomes to gerrymander effectively. Increasing
the size of the House means more accountability, better
representation, and increased diversity in Congress.

How many seats should be added to the House? We propose
using the Cube Root Rule to determine the number. Under the
Cube Root Rule, the size of a country’s legislature is the cubed
root of the country’s population. This means the number of
House seats would be the cubed root of the U.S. population,
minus 100 (to account for the 100 Senators). Based on the
2010 census, this approach would add 141 seats to the House
(and decrease the average constituency size to around
540,000 people). Adhering to the Cube Root Rule would put
the U.S. in good company with many other democratic nations.
Importantly, the Cube Root Rule should be implemented as
a permanent formula to determine House seats so Congress
would not need to pass a new law every time the population
significantly changes. The Cube Root Rule simply responds
to population changes—as the U.S. population increases or
decreases, so can the size of Congress.
To draw districts following the House expansion, we
recommend a novel plan: the Primary Allocation Model. This
system would practically eliminate partisan gerrymandering
and it would increase voter turnout in congressional elections.
Under the Primary Allocation approach, there would be two
“election rounds.” The first round would take place four to six
months before the second round. All voters would register
with a political party (or remain independent) before the first
round. The first round would be open to the entire state. Voters
would cast votes for their preferred political party, not for a
specific candidate. Districts would then be allocated to political
parties based on results of the first round. Each political party
with multiple districts would draw a district map across the
entire state. A political party with one district would have an
“at large” district covering the entire state. The second round of
the elections would have the declared candidates campaigning
against members of their own party in their districts. Voters in
the second round would be eligible to vote only for candidates
of the party they supported in the first-round election.
Allowing political parties to create their own districts would end
the incentive for partisan gerrymandering. Elections would also
be far more competitive, which would inspire more voters to
come to the polls.
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Introduction
“The truth is, that in all cases, a certain number at least seems
to be necessary to secure the benefits of free consultation and
discussion, and to guard against too easy a combination for
improper purposes; as on the other hand, the number ought
at most to be kept within a certain limit, in order to avoid the
confusion and intemperance of a multitude.”1
—James Madison, Federalist No. 55
In 1929, there were 435 members of the House of
Representatives. If that number seems familiar, it may be
because in 2020 there are still 435 members of the House.
1
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (James Madison).
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This is by design—a 1929 law capped the number of House
members at 435. Today, this law causes many problems for
our representative democracy, primarily because dramatic
growth in the U.S. population has created exceedingly large
congressional districts. This report addresses how to fix the
problems inherent with large districts. Part I looks at the history
of the House, with an emphasis on size and seat allocation.
Part II discusses the reasons the House should be expanded.
Part III analyzes methods for expanding the House, ultimately
recommending a population-based mathematical rule. Finally,
Part IV discusses a serious problem created by large districts—
partisan gerrymandering—and offers a solution.

I. A History of Representation
A. The People’s House
The concept of fair representation has been a crucial element
of American government since the nation’s founding. The
Revolution was, in part, a contest about the very definition
of representation. In England, the House of Commons
represented every British subject regardless of whether all of
the subjects could actually vote for the Commons’ membership.
In this sense, most people living in areas under British rule—
including North America—were only “virtually represented”
in Parliament.22 American colonists, who were accustomed
to controlling their local affairs in the directly-elected colonial
legislatures, lacked a voice in Parliament and resented the
British policies imposed on them. They rallied behind the now
familiar motto: “No taxation without representation!”3 After the
war, the founders struggled to design a system of government
to better represent the inhabitants of the new country. The
Articles of Confederation created the first national congress
to represent the interests of the states; under the Articles,
each state appointed between two and seven delegates to the
congress, and each state delegation had one vote.4
This system proved unworkable. The Articles did not vest
enough power in congress to effectively govern national affairs
and prevent interstate conflict.5 The founders had largely
avoided complicated questions of how to balance the interests
of different states and their citizens in national policymaking
by leaving most fundamental governing issues to state
legislatures.6 The failure of this model led the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention of 1787 to design a system with a
stronger national government. A key question was how such
a government would best represent and empower individuals,
communities, and states across the nation.
One of the main concerns that overtook the Convention was the
size of the House of Representatives.7 It was part of the struggle
between large and small states that colored most of the
Convention. Pennsylvania Delegate Benjamin Franklin summed
up the disagreement, observing,

If a proportional representation takes place, the small
States contend that their liberties will be in danger. If an
equality of votes is to be put in its place, the large States
say their money will be in danger. When a broad table is to
be made, and the edges of planks do not fit, the artist takes
a little from both and makes a good joint.8
The “good joint” that emerged from weeks of gridlock was
called the “Great Compromise.” It created a bicameral
legislature with a House, where state population determined
membership, and a Senate, where each state had two seats
regardless of population.9
The House of Representatives was intended to be the branch
of government most intimately tied to popular will. Federalist
No. 52, which either James Madison or Alexander Hamilton
authored, argued the House should have “an immediate
dependence on, and intimate sympathy with, the people.”10
Members of the House have been directly elected by American
voters since the chamber’s formation.11 Unlike the Senate, the
House is not a continuing body. Its members must stand for
election every two years, after which it convenes for a new
session and essentially reconstitutes itself—electing a Speaker,
swearing-in the members, and approving a slate of officers
to administer the institution. Direct, biennial elections and
its relatively large size have made the House receptive to a
continual influx of new ideas and priorities that contribute to its
longstanding reputation as the “People’s House.”
The framers intended for the House to continuously grow.12
Most agreed that the strength of the lower house would be
derived from the continued ability of the representatives to
accurately reflect the “interests and circumstances” of their
constituents.13 Only through gradual expansion would the
House remain a democratic and truly representative institution.
8

1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 488 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).

9

See id. at 524.

10 THE FEDERALIST No. 52.
11

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.

2

See Edmund S. Morgan, Colonial Ideas of Parliamentary Power 1764-1766, 5
WM. & MARY Q. 311, 331-34 (1948).

3

Id.

4

See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. V.

5

JOHN FERLING, A LEAP IN THE DARK: THE STRUGGLE TO CREATE THE AMERICAN 291
(2003).

12 See Christopher St. John Yates, A House of Our Own or A House We’ve
Outgrown? An Argument for Increasing the Size of the House of Representatives,
25 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 157, 175-79 (1992); see also THE FEDERALIST NO.
58 (James Madison) (explaining that one of the purposes of the Decennial
Census was “to augment the number of representatives … under the sole
limitation that the whole number shall not exceed one for every thirty
thousand inhabitants”).

6

Id.

13 Yates, supra note 12, 178-79.

7

See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 78 (2005); see also
FERLING, supra note 5, at 292.
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B. Growth of the House and the Permanent
Apportionment Act
As the U.S. population grew in the nation’s early history,
so too did the size of the People’s House. The Constitution
imposed only one limit on the House’s size: that the “Number
of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty
Thousand.”14 Though an amendment was attempted after the
Convention to tie the House’s size to the nationwide population,
it fell short of ratification by one state.15
The Constitution requires reapportionment of House seats
every ten years following the census.16 Congress has used
several methods to determine the size of the House and the
allocation of its seats.17
Congress initially used what has been called the Jefferson
method.18 This approach involved setting a desired populationto-representative ratio, such as 30,000 to 1, and then dividing
each state’s population by the population figure in the ratio
to determine the size of each state’s respective House
delegation.19 Under this approach, decimals are rounded to the
lowest whole number.20 If a state’s population was 920,000
and the ratio chosen was 30,000 to 1, the formula would give
the state 30 representatives after rounding down from 30.66.
Congress used the Jefferson method through the expansion
based on the 1830 census.21 For the rest of the 19th century,
Congress used either the Webster or Hamilton method, which
instead asked Congress to choose a number of representatives
and used people-to-representative ratios and rounding to
ensure appropriate allocation of those seats.22 In any case, the
size of the House steadily increased during this period—though
the ratio of people to representatives had increased to roughly
70,000 by 1830. Following the 1830 census, the House had
grown to 240 members from 105 after the first apportionment
in 1792.23

By the mid-1800s, some legislators were beginning to
question whether the House should continue to expand
and whether Congress should engage in a debate over the
issue every decade. A permanent apportionment bill setting
the size of the House at 233 was enacted by Congress in
1850,24 though Congress effectively ignored that cap and
continued expanding in successive decades.25 Following
the Civil War, the population expanded dramatically due
to heavy immigration from Southern Europe to American
cities.26 By 1900, the House had reached 386 members
and was expanded to 433 following the 1910 census.27 Two
more states, Arizona and New Mexico, entered the Union in
the following decade, bringing the total membership to the
modern cap of 435.28 In 1920, it was anticipated that to avoid
any single state losing a representative, the membership
would need to be expanded by another 60 seats.29
Members of Congress began to believe that the size of the
House needed to be capped. While some argued for continued
expansion to allow the House to better represent constituents,
others asserted that a larger size would prevent the House
from functioning efficiently.30 Immigration also impacted
this debate—rural representatives were fearful that the 1920
apportionment would result in urban areas receiving several
new seats, which would give those communities much greater
relative power in the legislature.31 Division over the issue
prevented the House from being expanded following the 1920
census.32
Debate on the apportionment issue in Congress lingered
through the 1920s without a resolution.33 With the 1930 census
approaching, public pressure was coming to bear on the issue,
as the population of several states had grown significantly,
and the allocation of representatives had remained entirely
unchanged. In 1928, the House took up a bill that would cap
its membership at 435 representatives and establish an
automatic allocation procedure following the upcoming census.

14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
15 See Richard Edward McLawhorn Jr., Apportionment or Size? Why the U.S.
House of Representatives Should Be Expanded, 62 ALA. L. REV. 1069, 1072
(2011).
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
17 See McLawhorn, supra note 15, at 1070-76; Methods of Apportionment,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/reference/
apportionment/methods_of_apportionment.html.
18 MICHEL L. BALINSKI & H. PAYTON YOUNG, FAIR REPRESENTATION: MEETING THE IDEAL OF
ONE MAN, ONE VOTE 23 (2001).
19 Id. at 10-11.
20 Id. at 11.
21 McLawhorn, supra note 15, at 1074.
22 Id. at 1074-75.
23 Id. at 1074.
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24 BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 18, at 37.
25 McLawhorn, supra note 15, at 1075.
26 Byron J. Harden, House of the Rising Population: The Case for Eliminating the
435-Member Limit on the U.S. House of Representatives, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 73,
79 (2011-2012).
27 McLawhorn, supra note 15, at 1075.
28 Charles A. Kromkowski & John A. Kromkowski, Why 435? A Question of
Political Arithmetic, 24 POLITY 129, 133 (1991).
29 McLawhorn, supra note 15, at 1076.
30 Id.
31 Harden, supra note 25, at 79.
32 Kromkowski & Kromkowski, supra note 28, at 134.
33 McLawhorn, supra note 15, at 1077.

Ultimately, the legislation gave Congress approval power over
the method used in any given reapportionment, with a default
to the method used in the prior reapportionment if no approval
was given.34 The Permanent Apportionment Act became law in
1929.35

C. The House Today
The Permanent Apportionment Act continues to dictate the
size of the House and the allocation of seats among the states.
The issue has not been substantively revisited by Congress
since the Act’s passage nearly a century ago, and it has received
limited scholarly attention in recent decades. As a result,
congressional districts have more than tripled in size over the

34 See Yates, supra note 12, at 180.
35 The Permanent Apportionment Act of 1929, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
https://history.house.gov/Historical-Highlights/1901-1950/ThePermanent-Apportionment-Act-of-1929/.

last century—from an average of roughly 212,000 inhabitants
after the 1910 Census to about 710,000 inhabitants following
the 2010 Census.36 It is projected that each member of
Congress will represent a million or more people by 2050.37
At a minimum, the ballooning size of districts suggests the
House is functioning in a way that provides lower quality
representation to constituents than when Congress’s
membership froze in 1911.38 In recent years, a small number of
scholars and journalists have begun arguing that apportionment
should be revisited as a matter of democratic prerogative.39 This
is where our analysis begins.
36 United States Population Projections: 2000-2050, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://
www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/working-papers/2009/
demo/us-pop-proj-2000-2050/analytical-document09.pdf.
37 Id.
38 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an
Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1248 (1989) (“The
Framers believed that the potential danger of factionalism in the House
of Representatives would be counteracted by its close dependence on
the people and its impermanence relative to the other institutions of
government.”).
39 See, e.g., Editorial Board, America Needs a Bigger House, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/09/opinion/
expanded-house-representatives-size.html; Dylan Matthews, The Case
for Massively Expanding the U.S. House of Representatives, in One Chart, VOX
(June 4, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/6/4/17417452/congressrepresentation-ratio-district-size-chart-graph; Chris Wilson, How to Fix
the House of Representatives in One Easy, Radical Step, TIME (Oct. 15, 2018),
http://time.com/5423623/house-representatives-number-seats/.
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II. Why The House Must Be Expanded
Expanding the House would allow the chamber to conform to
the framers’ vision for it and to modern political and popular
notions of what representative democracy should be. We
identify eight discrete and distinct reasons for this change. We
also respond to the primary arguments made by opponents of a
House expansion.

A. Local Responsiveness and Equal
Representation
As districts grow in size,40 more constituents are deprived of
adequate representation. To win re-election, candidates are
practically required to bargain with some interest groups over
others within their districts. The interest groups and political
minorities that candidates eschew are ultimately losers in
the electoral process, both deprived of a functional vote and
representation of their interests in the House. A larger House
corrects for this issue by granting more representatives to
each state and allowing those new districts to capture the
preferences of a greater number of political communities.
Large districts may make it harder for constituents to receive
help navigating the federal bureaucracy. Many Americans rely
on their members of Congress to obtain essential information
about government programs and benefits. By 2050, Americans
who depend on their representatives for help will be one of a
million; members and their staffs will necessarily have to triage
constituent concerns to an even greater degree than they do
now. Expanding the House would allow representatives to
provide more hands-on help to constituents and relieve the
burden on each member’s staff.
The cap on House members creates unequal representation
among districts.41 Each state’s congressional delegation
changes as a result of population shifts, with many states either
gaining or losing seats after each census. But this process is
imperfect. Given the increasingly wide population disparity
between small and large states, it is mathematically impossible
to ensure that each member represents the same number
of constituents, or even roughly the same number in many
cases. Currently, Montana’s population of 1,050,493 people
grants it just one House member.42 Rhode Island, has only a
slightly larger population, with 1,059,639 residents, but that’s
enough to give it two representatives, which grants Rhode
40 Drew Desilver, U.S. Population Keeps Growing, but House of Representatives
is Same Size as in Taft Era, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (May 31, 2018), https://www.
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/31/u-s-population-keeps-growingbut-house-of-representatives-is-same-size-as-in-taft-era/.
41 Id.

B. Mitigating Partisan Gerrymandering
Increasing the size of the House may limit partisan
gerrymandering.45 After seats are apportioned every ten
years, each state is responsible for drawing districts. Partisan
gerrymandering of these districts has been a feature of
American democracy for centuries, but recent decades have
seen particularly extreme cases of statehouse majorities using
their districting power to greatly diminish the representation of
the opposing political party.46 Larger legislatures make it more
difficult to gerrymander effectively.47 If there was a state with
100 residents and 100 congressional districts, gerrymandering
would be impossible; if there are 50 congressional districts, it
would not be impossible, but very difficult. The House would
never be expanded to such a point that gerrymandering could
be wholly eliminated, but a larger House would make it harder
to entirely lock out a political minority of representation and
cement the majority’s hold on power.

C. Electoral College Parity
Each state’s vote total in the Electoral College is derived
from its total congressional representation—the sum of its
two senators and its total House delegation.48 This means
legislative apportionment and representation are inherently
tied to presidential selection. The lack of parity in House
apportionment among states impacts states’ influence in
the Electoral College. Large states would be the primary
43 Id.
44 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964).
45 Harden, supra note 26, 98-99.
46 See, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013); Alabama Legislative
Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015); Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct.
1455 (2017). See also Gerrymandering at the Supreme Court, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUST., https://www.brennancenter.org/gerrymandering-scotus (last visited
Aug. 9, 2019).
47 Id.
48 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.

42 Id.

8

Islanders one representative for every 529,820 residents.43
Courts have not applied the “one person, one vote” doctrine
to congressional districts across state lines; it is only a
restriction on the drawing of legislative districts within states.44
However, constitutional doctrine notwithstanding, the quality
of Americans’ representation should not depend on the state
they happen to live in. Increasing the number of representatives
who can be allocated among the states makes the task of
equal apportionment easier by increasing the pool of seats
to be equally divided and produces more parity in interstate
representation ratios.
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beneficiaries of a House expansion because they typically have
higher than average population-to-representative ratios due to
the limited number of seats and the requirement that each state
receive at least one. But some small states, such as Montana,
that have high ratios would also benefit. Expanding the House
mitigates these parity disadvantages and cabins the small-state
advantage in the Electoral College to the two-vote baseline,
which is the advantage the system was originally intended to
confer.

D. Preventing Corruption and Capture by
Special Interests
A stagnant political body is vulnerable to capture by powerful
interests. The House is no exception. This concern was
paramount among supporters of the proposed constitutional
amendment in the Framing Era to tie the House’s membership
to population growth.49 They feared corruption was more likely
where representatives were not intimately familiar with their
voters, and that the powerful would more easily commandeer a
smaller body than a larger one.50 Special interests have become
intimately familiar with the operation of both chambers of
Congress, and exert considerable influence over committee
assignments, legislative priorities, primary candidates,
campaigns, and government oversight of their activities.51
There are manifold reasons for this phenomenon beyond the
structure of the House, but increasing its membership would
disrupt these dynamics by requiring some changes to House
administration.
Additionally, large districts make campaigns costlier. Winning
the support of a majority of voters in a 750,000-person district
requires significant financial resources that candidates often
need to obtain from wealthy benefactors and powerful interest
groups. An expanded House would reduce the financial barrier
to entry for candidates and, in effect, decrease the leverage that
well-financed groups have over them.

E. Third Party Representation
Third parties struggle to obtain any representation at the
federal level. This is in part because congressional districts are
too large for third-party candidates to reach a critical level of
49 Anthony J. Gaughan, To End Gerrymandering: The Canadian Model for
Reforming the Congressional Redistricting Process in the United States, 41 CAP.
U. L. REV. 999, 1006 (2013).
50 Yates, supra note 12, at 177-78.
51 See Richard A. Smith, Interest Group Influence in the U. S. Congress, 20 LEGIS.
STUD. Q. 89, 139 (Feb. 1995).

support, either because of high financial costs or because of the
necessary compromises with interest groups. Smaller districts
allow independent and third-party candidates to run issuedriven campaigns that speak specifically to the concerns of a
geographic community. They also make it easier for candidates
to reach the critical number of voters needed to win a seat.
Finally, more seats in the House diminishes the significance
of any single seat in determining a congressional majority. A
third-party voter may therefore feel less concerned that their
third-party vote will be “wasted” or will “spoil” the election of
a preferred major party candidate and preferred congressional
majority. Given the confines of the plurality system, House
expansion may be the most effective means of promoting
independent and third-party representation.

F. Diversity
Incumbency is very powerful in federal elections, especially
in safe districts where a major party is overwhelmingly likely
to win regardless of its candidates. Expanding the House
would not eliminate the benefits of incumbency. However, an
immediate increase in House seats to accommodate for several
decades of stagnation would create tremendous opportunity
for new voices to enter government. Overwhelmingly, these
voices would likely be younger, more female, more non-white,
and more demographically representative of America than
the current makeup of Congress. Political and socioeconomic
diversity would also be enhanced, as discussed.

G. Party Conformance and Control
Expanding the House may help undo the bitter partisan
dynamic in the chamber. A larger House would create greater
opportunity for members to defect from their parties on key
issues and build coalitions with other members to advance
legislation and oversight prerogatives. An increase in third
party representation could also reduce partisanship by denying
a major party a majority or forcing some kind of coalition
government.

H. Scope of Work
Finally, expanding the House may make some administrative
functions easier. The scope of Congress’s powers and work
have only expanded in the modern era, and the issues that
each congressperson deals with, either in representing their
community or in their committee and legislative assignments,
has only continued to grow. Representatives in the House
arguably have too much work, and do not perform their jobs
as well as they would like because of it. Smaller districts would
Democracy Clinic
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reduce the number of salient interests representatives must
consider in legislating because their districts would have fewer
political communities. Additionally, a larger House allows
committee work and assignments to be distributed among
more members, giving each member more time to focus on
their remaining tasks.

J. Responding to Critics
The idea of lifting the 435-member limit is not without its
critics. This Part addresses some of their concerns.

1. Physical Space
Some may argue that the Capitol building cannot accommodate
more members of Congress. One of the primary concerns
behind this criticism is that insufficient space could undermine
the body’s deliberative nature by preventing members from
gathering in the House chamber to debate and collaborate on
important legislation.
But the current House chamber is almost certainly capable of
seating more than 435 people; in fact, it does so every year at
the State of the Union Address, when most, if not all, Senators,
Cabinet secretaries, Supreme Court justices, and military
service chiefs assemble on the House floor. Even if the current
facilities were not large enough, more space could be created.
Office buildings could be erected within the Capitol complex to
accommodate more members, and the Capitol building itself
could be modified or expanded to allow every member to fit on
the floor. Additionally, most negotiation and deliberation does
not take place on the floor of the House—it occurs in committee
meetings, behind closed doors, and in other settings.52 Often,
House members speak to a mostly empty chamber when they
make speeches from the floor.53 Others members and their
staffs track the proceedings on the floor on C-SPAN from their
offices.

2. Inefficiency
A larger number of representatives with more divergent
viewpoints could result in some inefficiencies, such as making
consensus-building harder and more time consuming. Creating
space for more views would involve making the effort and
52 Kromkowski & Kromkowski, supra note 28, at 144.
53 Id.
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taking the time to accommodate those new perspectives.
But hierarchies will still exist in House administration such
that individual representatives will look to leadership—in
committees, in their party, or otherwise—to help develop their
views on specific issues. If members have a smaller committee
load, as would probably result from a larger House, they may
also be able to develop greater expertise and influence in the
policy areas they choose to focus on. Additionally, if expanding
the House reduces partisan advantage from gerrymandering,
there will likely be a greater number of swing districts in the
House, increasing the incentive for compromise across the
aisle and the likelihood that legislation can be passed. Though
coordinating among more members would present new
challenges, there are offsetting benefits and good reasons for
the additional work it would require.

3. Cost and Size of Government
Finally, some may question whether taxpayers should foot the
bill for an expansion of Congress, particularly at a time when
public satisfaction with Congress (and politicians broadly) is
especially low.54 But there are two strong counterpoints. First,
the budget for congressional salaries is already an exceedingly
low percentage of the total federal budget—a representative’s
salary and office budget totals about $1 million each year.55
Appropriating for the salaries of even 200 more members
would not make a substantial dent in the budget. Second,
dissatisfaction with Congress may be impacted by the structure
of the body. A more representative Congress may produce
greater public approval, and better political outcomes for the
body politic. This could especially be true if a House expansion
reins in the influence of moneyed interests. And some studies
even suggest an increased legislature size would reduce
government spending in aggregate.56
54 Congress and the Public, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1600/
congress-public.aspx (last visited Aug. 7, 2019).
55 IDA A. BRUDNICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL300064, SALARIES AND ALLOWANCES: IN
BRIEF 5 (2018), https://www.senate.gov/CRSpubs/9c14ec69-c4e4-4bd88953-f73daa1640e4.pdf; IDA A. BRUDNICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40962,
MEMBERS’ REPRESENTATIONAL ALLOWANCE: HISTORY AND USAGE (2019), https://fas.
org/sgp/crs/misc/R40962.pdf.
56 See, e.g., Larry Sabato, Expand the House of Representatives, DEMOCRACY J.
MAG., Spring 2008, https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/8/expandthe-house-of-representatives/.

III. Expanding the House
For a century and a half after the first Congress met, Congress
expanded the House and allocated seats on a piecemeal
basis as the nation’s population grew. Partisan and legislative
incentives always permeated the process—re-allocations
rarely took seats away from states,57 for example—but these
tensions reached a breaking point when no reapportionment
occurred after the 1920 census. Congress further abdicated
its role in 1929 when it capped the size of the House at 435
and delegated some of its reallocation power to the executive
branch.58 Following the 1940 and 1941 amendments to the
Permanent Apportionment Act, reapportionment was placed
on “automatic pilot.”59
Congress cannot continue to ignore the issues caused by the
House’s insufficient size. The institution is not living up to the
framers’ vision for it. Expansion of the chamber’s membership
will help it function as intended and more effectively serve
the nation. This section examines four practical and politically
realistic methods of expansion: two population-based rules
(the Cube Root Rule and the Wyoming Rule), an incremental
approach, and a one-time expansion. This section ultimately
recommends passage of a single piece of legislation to repeal
the Permanent Apportionment Act and tie the size of the House
to the cube root of the nation’s population.

A. Four Methods of Expansion
Before arguing for the Cube Root Rule as the best approach
to House expansion, we describe and analyze that method
alongside three other viable approaches to increasing the
House’s membership.

1. The Cube Root Rule
The Cube Root Rule is a commonly-suggested formula in
academic literature for determining a national legislature’s
size. In Rein Taagepera’s influential 1972 article, The Size of
National Assemblies, Taagepera noted a geometric pattern
among population size and assembly size throughout the
world.60 After examining the size of the lower chambers of
national assemblies in the 1960s, he found that the size of a
country’s national assembly often approximated the cube root
of its population.61 Since Taagepera’s findings, the “Cube Root
Rule” has been widely studied,62 and research suggests the
U.S. roughly adhered to this calculation until 1910.63 Research
also reveals that many national assemblies still conform to
this rule. Figure 1 displays the population, cube root of the
population, and national legislature size of 37 countries that
comprised the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development. in 2017. The size of most of the legislatures is
either very close to the cube root of the population or contains
more representatives than the cube root would suggest.64
Congress, however, is significantly smaller than the cube root of
the U.S. population. Among the countries listed in Figure 1, only
Colombia has a greater negative discrepancy between the cube
root of its population and the size of its legislature.
60 Rein Taagepera, The Size of National Assemblies, 1 SOC. SCI. RESEARCH 385
(1972).
61 Id. at 386; Arend Lijphart, Reforming the House: Three Moderately Radical
Proposals, 31 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 10, 12 (1998).
62 Jeffrey W. Ladewig & Mathew P. Jasinski, On the Causes and Consequences
of and Remedies for Interstate Malapportionment of the U.S. House of
Representatives, 6 PERSP. ON POL. 89, 98 (2008).
63 Id. at 99-100.

57 Congressional Apportionment, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://history.
house.gov/Institution/Apportionment/Apportionment/ (last visited May
15, 2019).

64 Id. at 99.

58 McLawhorn, supra note 15, at 1079.
59 Kromkowksi & Kromskowsi, supra note 28, at 134-35.
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Figure 1.65
Country

National Population*

Cube Root of
Population**

National Legislature
Size***

Difference of National Legislature
Size and Cube Root

Australia

23,800,000

288

150

-138

Austria

8,679,000

206

183

-23

Belgium

11,288,000

224

150

-74

Canada

35,950,000

330

337

+7

Chile

17,763,000

261

120

-141

Colombia

48,229,000

364

166

-198

Czech Republic

10,604,000

220

200

-20

Denmark

5,689,000

179

179

0

Estonia

1,315,000

110

101

-9

Finland

5,482,000

176

200

+24

France

64,457,000

401

577

+176

Germany

81,708,000

434

630

+196

Greece

11,218,000

224

300

+76

Hungary

9,784,000

214

199

-15

Iceland

330,000

69

63

-6

Ireland

4,700,000

168

158

-10

Israel

8,065,000

201

120

-81

Italy

5,9504,000

390

630

+240

Japan

127,975,000

504

475

-29

Korea

50,594,000

370

300

-70

Latvia

1,993,000

126

100

-26

Lithuania

2,932,000

143

141

-2

Luxembourg

567,000

83

60

-23

Mexico

125,891,000

501

500

-1

Netherlands

16,938,000

257

150

-107

New Zealand

4,615,000

166

119

-47

Norway

5,200,000

173

169

-4

Poland

38,265,000

337

460

+123

Portugal

10,418,000

218

230

+12

Slovak Republic

5,439,000

176

150

-26

Slovenia

2,075,000

128

90

-38

Spain

46,398,000

359

350

-9

Sweden

9,764,000

214

349

-135

Switzerland

8,320,000

203

200

-3

Turkey

78,271,000

428

550

+122

United Kingdom

65,397,000

403

650

+247

United States

319,929,000

684

535

-149

* Data concerning population was provided in thousands. It is based on 2015 population data.
** Cube root is rounded to the nearest hundred.
*** Generally, the national legislature size refers only to the lower house in each country. For the United States, the number is the combined size of the House and Senate.

65 Government at a Glance 2017: Contextual Factors, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/gov/government-at-a-glance-2017-contextual-factors.pdf (last visited May 15, 2019).
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Why do most legislatures conform to this rule? The reasons
are not clear. Every nation determines the size of its legislature
differently. Taagepera theorized that conformance to the Cube
Root Rule creates the optimal balance between representativeconstituent communication and communication among
legislators themselves.66
The Cube Root Rule provides for the growth of a legislature with
the size of the population it represents—a natural evolution in a
robust, representative democracy. Over time, the practicalities
of governing—like collaborating with other legislators—start to
become more difficult the larger a legislature expands. These
consequences are met, however, by the slowing rate of growth
of the legislature under the cube root formula. In other words,
the growth will be marginal relative to additions to the total
national population. In a nation as large as the U.S., the Cube
Root Rule would provide a consistent and measured approach
to expanding the legislature in response to population growth,
and if Taagepera’s theory is correct, it will optimize constituent
responsiveness and congressional relationships.

Rule.70 The majority of proposals advocating adoption of the
Cube Root Rule in the U.S. have taken the latter approach.
Figure 2 illustrates the number of House seats that would be
added under that system.
An initial increase in representation under the Cube Root Rule
based on the population in the 2010 census would result in
about 141 additional House seats. Subsequent increases would
be relatively stable according to current population projections
at roughly 15 new seats per decade, even alongside population
growth of over 70 million people. The hallmark feature of the
Cube Root Rule—slowing legislature growth as the population
gets larger71—is clear in this model. The projected population
growth between decades is roughly equivalent in the table
(about 21-25 million), but by 2040, this growth produces only
13 additional seats (compared to 17 additional seats in both
2020 and 2030). This trend is even more apparent on a larger
scale. At 500 million residents, the Cube Root Rule produces
a total legislature size of roughly 800; at 1 billion, it calls for
exactly 1,000—an increase of only 25% when the population

Figure 2.
Year

Total U.S. Population67

Cube root of U.S.
population (to 2
decimals)

Total Number of
House seats

Change from prior size

Average Constituency

2010

308,745,538

675.88

576

+141

536,017

2020

332,527,548

692.80

593

+17

560,755

2030

357,975,719

710.04

610

+17

586,845

2040

379,392,779

723.93

623

+13

608,977

Literature advocating the Cube Root Rule’s application to the
House is divided on whether the number of House seats should
account for the 100 Senate seats. Those who argue against
including Senate seats cite Taagepera’s original finding that
the size of many countries’ lower (usually largest) legislative
chambers approximate the cube root of the countries’
populations,68 while others eschew this finding to advocate
for counting the total seats in the House and Senate.69 The
latter group views the Senate as a more significant body than
small chambers in other countries, which, they argue, supports
including all federal legislators when applying the Cube Root
66 Ladewig & Jasinksi, supra note 62, at 98.
67 Observed and Total Population for the U.S. and the States, 2010-2040,
DEMOGRAPHICS RES. GROUP, WELDON COOPER CTR. FOR PUB. SERVICE, https://
demographics.coopercenter.org/national-population-projections (last
updated Dec. 2018).
68 See Lijphart, supra note 61; see also Ladewig & Jasinski, supra note 62, at 99.
69 See Daniel Greenberg, Why 435? How We Can Change the Size of the House
of Representatives, FAIRVOTE (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.fairvote.org/
how_we_can_change_the_size_of_the_house_of_representatives; see also
America Needs a Bigger House, supra note 39.

is doubled. Accordingly, one would expect successively
smaller increases in decades after 2040 even if large and fast
population growth continues.
Slower growth in the House over time makes the body more
manageable and avoids the potential for runaway growth in the
chamber. However, under the Cube Root Rule, as the national
population increases, so does the average constituency size;
in Figure 2, the average district grows by 13% from 2010 to
2040. Many of the reasons for expanding the House discussed
in this report (specifically: responsiveness, representativeness,
proportionality, and anti-corruption) are intimately tied with
a decrease in constituency size. A system that increases that
metric over time may mitigate the important, beneficial effects
of additional House seats.
70 See America Needs a Bigger House, supra note 39.
71 See Brian Frederick, Not Quite a Full House: The Case for Enlarging the House of
Representatives, 28 BRIDGEWATER REV., Dec. 2009, at 23, 23.

Democracy Clinic

13

Notably, an important benefit of the Cube Root Rule is that
it could decrease the discrepancies in district size across the
country. An article published before the 2010 census found
that application of the Cube Root Rule would “significantly
diminish” the extent of interstate malapportionment.72
Among states with the largest discrepancies between
average constituency size and the national average, the
discrepancy would be reduced by 40 percent.73 Among the
ten largest states, the discrepancy would be reduced by 56
percent.74 The article acknowledged that though not every
state would see a decrease in the discrepancy between its
average constituency size and the national average, the
representation of each person would become more equal in
Congress.75
Although the Cube Root Rule has support in the political
science community, convincing lawmakers to support it may
prove difficult. Because the Cube Root Rule is a formula based
on data that Congress cannot control (the national population),
lawmakers may favor an incremental or onetime expansion
where they control how much the House size increases and
at what pace. Furthermore, the Cube Root Rule’s higher
complexity compared to other approaches may present
challenges in fostering public understanding and support.
Lawmakers will probably not act on a specific method of
expansion unless they have the support of voters.

vote” doctrine on a national scale.78 Under the Wyoming Rule,
the total national population would be divided by the population
of the smallest state (which is currently Wyoming),79 and the
resulting quotient would be rounded to the nearest whole
number.80 This number would become the size of the House.81
Figure 3 illustrates the rule’s application to the House today
and for the projected population for the next three decades.
Interestingly, the formulation would come to depend on the
state of Vermont, as Vermont is projected to have the smallest
state population by 2040.82
The Wyoming Rule initially expands the House by a smaller
number than the Cube Root Rule, but it dictates a larger total
body by 2040. While the average constituency is smaller than
the average constituency produced by the Cube Root Rule from
2010 to 2030, by 2040, the average constituency under the
Wyoming Rule is larger than the average constituency produced
by the Cube Root Rule.
Making the average House district represent the same number
of people as the smallest state’s population produces less
difference in constituency sizes across the nation. Theoretically,
this deviation would be smaller than under the Cube Root Rule
because the size of each constituency is measured according to
the size of the smallest constituency (the smallest state). But
this feature leads to a potential downside of the

Figure 3.
Year

Total U.S. Population76

Population of Smallest
State77

Total Number of
House seats

Change from prior
decade

Average Constituency

2010

308,745,538

563,626 (WY)

548

+113

563,404

2020

332,527,548

585,380 (WY)

568

+20

585,436

2030

357,975,719

605,972 (WY)

591

+23

605,712

2040

379,392,779

601,865 (VT)

630

+39

602,211

2. The Wyoming Rule
The Wyoming Rule is an alternative and uniquely American
approach to a mathematical population-based rule for
legislature size. Its purpose is to apply the “one person, one
72 Ladewig & Jasinski, supra note 62, at 100.
73 Id.
74 Id.

Wyoming Rule—the smallest state will always only have one
representative. This could lead to opposition from states that
are at risk of becoming the smallest state. However, there
are currently seven states with a single representative in the
House.83 After the next census, Rhode Island is expected to lose
78 See FAIRVOTE, MORE MEMBERS, MORE VOICES: POLICIES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
CHANGING THE SIZE OF THE U.S. HOUSE 8 (2018), https://www.fairvote.org/
house_size_report.
79 Id.

75 Id.

80 Id.

76 Id.

81 Id.

77 Id.

82 Observed and Total Population, supra note 70.
83 The seven states are: Alaska, Delaware, Montana, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming.
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one of its two seats, and, unless offset by another small state,
the House will have more single-member state delegations than
it has ever had.84 This is the predictable result of a system with
low population states and an increasing average constituency
size nationally; inevitably, more small states will fall closer
in total population to the average district size and lose their
additional representatives. The Wyoming Rule tethers the
ratio low enough so that fewer states are stuck with a single
representative and provides plenty of additional seats for larger
states to avoid being grossly underrepresented.85
The benefits of the Wyoming Rule would extend into
presidential elections. Under the Rule, the apportionment
of votes each state gets in the Electoral College would more
closely align with the population of each state.86 As explained in
Part II, the total number of electoral votes each state receives is
its total number of representatives in both houses of Congress.
If congressional districts are more or less the same size, then
the outcome of the Electoral College would, theoretically, more
closely align with the outcome of the popular vote. However,
a recent study of presidential elections dating back to 1912
found that while the Wyoming Rule would have changed the
number of electoral votes presidential candidates received,
the outcomes of the elections would not have changed.87
Thus, while the Wyoming Rule would theoretically align the
outcome of the popular vote more closely with the outcome of
the Electoral College vote, it would not necessarily align closely
enough to change the outcome of an election where there is a
split between the popular and electoral votes. This possibility
exists because the Wyoming Rule would still produce variance
in district population size88—every state population will not be
an exact multiple of the population of the smallest state.
The key criticism of the Wyoming Rule is that tying the size of
the House to the population of the smallest state is too arbitrary.
As shown in Figure 3, the representative-to-population ratio
changes decade to decade according to the smallest state’s
population. There is nothing particularly reasoned about that level
84 Sean Trende, It’s Time to Increase the Size of the House, UNIV. OF VA. CTR. FOR
POL. (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/
its-time-to-increase-the-size-of-the-house/.
85 See FAIRVOTE, MORE MEMBERS, MORE VOICES, supra note 76, at 9-10; see also
Charles M. Biles, Congressional Apportionment: A Liberal Arts Perspective,
DIGITAL COMMONS @ HUMBOLDT ST. U. 36 (Sept. 20, 2016), https://pdfs.
semanticscholar.org/c7d4/3270e47c1a129666c787c6a9ea779979ee11.
pdf.
86 Implementing the “Wyoming Rule,” DAILY KOS (June 5, 2018), https://www.
dailykos.com/stories/2018/7/5/1778149/-Implementing-the-WyomingRule.
87 FAIRVOTE, MORE MEMBERS, MORE VOICES, supra note 76, at 12.
88 Id. at 15.

of representativeness—though it ensures some degree of parity
between state representation, it is not at all consistent from yearto-year, nor is it necessarily the optimal size of a congressional
district. The population of Vermont is predicted to decline in every
decade prior to 2040;89 if it continued on this trend (and Vermont
remained the smallest state), the Wyoming Rule would produce
an increasingly small average constituency size in the future.
Because of the Wyoming Rule’s arbitrariness, the number of
House seats is not guaranteed to move in one direction, or at
a measured rate. The size of the nation’s smallest state can
vary dramatically, significantly altering the size of the House.
For example, had the Wyoming Rule been used in 1920, there
would have been over 1,000 House seats.90 The possibility of
drastic changes in state population highlights the extent to
which the Wyoming Rule could become unworkable.
Though the Wyoming Rule is arbitrary, it is more easily
explained than perhaps any of the four methods of expansion
discussed in this report. On its surface, the Wyoming
Rule makes sense—each district has the same number
of people as the smallest state. This seeming equality
could be appealing to lawmakers and the public and make
implementation of this approach the easiest to accomplish.
Though the Wyoming Rule may not be the best method for
expansion, it could be the only method that gets enough
support from lawmakers and the public to actually achieve an
expansion of the House.

3. The Incremental Approach
Another approach could involve increasing the House’s size
incrementally every decade by a predetermined number. One
method of incremental expansion, proposed in a 1991 article by
Charles A. Kromkowski and John A. Kromkowski, contemplated
“marginal but decennial” increases in House size.91 The article
envisioned a 15-member increase each decade.92 The relevant
calculations for such an increase are included in Figure 4, with
an adjustment made to reflect the time passed since the article
was published. A very small incremental increase might attract
less opposition but it would very likely produce only minimal
benefits, if any.
89 Observed and Total Population, supra note 70.
90 FAIRVOTE, supra note 76, at 9. Nevada was the smallest state in 1920, at
around 77,000 residents, which meant the state represented about .07% of
the U.S. population. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 32-33 (1921), https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/1921/
compendia/statab/43ed/1920-02.pdf.
91 Kromkowski & Kromkowski, supra note 28, at 144.
92 Id. at 145.
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Figure 4.
Year

Total U.S. Population93

Total Number of House seats

Change from prior decade

Average Constituency Size

2010

308,745,538

480

+45

643,221

2020

332,527,548

495

+15

671,998

2030

357,975,719

510

+15

696,276

2040

379,392,779

525

+15

711,482

Alternatively, the increment could be set at a level that would
roughly maintain the same average constituency size. This
approach is uniquely workable at this moment, where population growth over the next three decades is expected to be
remarkably consistent.94 The House could leave the number
unchanged for the foreseeable future, or re-visit the number
once the “planned-for” period has expired (in say, 2040). Figure
5 illustrates what this particular approach would look like if
Congress determined the average constituency should be about
660,000 people. This approach would require a 35-member
increase in the House every ten years.

to less predictable variations driven by the cube root of the
population (the Cube Root Rule) or population of the smallest
state (the Wyoming Rule). A plan that puts Congress in
control and uses straightforward math would likely be quite
palatable to legislators. It would afford Congress the freedom
to decide growth rate and what goals it wants to accomplish
by expansion. The plan’s simplicity might also attract more
public support for the plan than some of the other possible
approaches.
A formidable downside of the incremental approach is its
dependence on population projections. These estimates cannot

Figure 5.
Year

Total U.S. Population95

Total Number of House seats

Change from prior decade

Average Constituency Size

2010

308,745,538

470

+35

656,905

2020

332,527,548

505

+35

658,470

2030

357,975,719

540

+35

662,918

2040

379,392,779

575

+35

659,814

Figure 6.
Year

U.S. Population

Number of House Seats

Average Constituency Size

2010

308,745,538

485

636,589

2020

332,527,548

485

685,624

2030

357,975,719

485

738,094

2040

379,392,779

485

782,253

The main benefit of an incremental approach is foresight.
The pre-determined expansion gives House members time
to anticipate necessary practical changes that come with
expansion, like physical space and budget. It also gives
political parties and institutions a clear sense of how many
new lawmakers to anticipate each decade, which could
help them adjust their campaign strategies and resource
allocations. Finally, legislators would feel more in control of
the expansion process. An incremental approach relies on an
expansion pace set by Congress, as opposed to one subject
93 Observed and Total Population, supra note 70.
94 See id.
95 Id.
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accommodate for unforeseen mass changes in population. If
the national population changed drastically and Congress felt
compelled to act, it would need to pass a new expansion law.
The possibility of unanticipated changes in population weighs
against the benefit of foresight that an incremental approach
would provide.

4. A Onetime Expansion
Perhaps the most straightforward approach to expanding the
House is a onetime expansion. Like the incremental approach,
the number of added seats could be any integer, and it could
be chosen to achieve any number of goals. In an interview we
conducted with Dr. Norman Ornstein of American Enterprise
Institute, he proposed adding 50 additional seats to the

House.96 Dr. Ornstein called 50 additional seats a “pragmatic
number.”97 The addition of 50 seats would bring the House’s
size to 485 members. Figure 6 illustrates what this onetime
expansion would look like over the next several decades.
A major benefit of this approach is the freedom it provides
to Congress. As with the incremental approach, lawmakers
can choose any integer, based on any (or no) criteria. An even
larger expansion may be possible with the onetime expansion
method as opposed to the incremental approach because a
large onetime expansion might be more palatable to many
than a change every decade. There would only need to be onetime changes to the Capitol complex’s physical spaces and
committees’ functioning and make-up. Congress could also
have time to learn how to function efficiently as a larger body,
and not need to readjust every decade after there is a new
addition of seats.
It would be hard to tie the onetime expansion to national
population changes. The onetime expansion sets a predetermined course that does not accommodate for
unanticipated fluctuations. If Congress determined after the
fact that the size of the House was seriously at odds with the
national population, it could pass a new expansion bill, but this
would reduce the benefits of using a one-and-done expansion
method in the first place.
Because the onetime expansion method does not
accommodate for changes in the national population, there
is a strong probability that, should this method of expansion
be utilized, the size of the average constituency would not be
greatly decreased from its current levels (or, the substantial
decrease would last only a decade or two). Figure 6 illustrates
that if 50 seats were added, the average constituency size
would surpass the current average constituency of roughly
750,000 people by 2040. If lawmakers could be convinced
that more than 50 additional seats were needed in the House,
then the average constituency size could stay below current
levels for a longer period of time. However, population increases
would eventually catch up to the addition of seats, and the
current average constituency would be surpassed.
96 Dr. Norman J. Ornstein proposed an expansion of the House as a way
to address the inequity of the Electoral College. Video Interview with Dr.
Norman J. Ornstein, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Inst. (Apr. 9,
2019).
97 Id.

B. Recommendation
We recommend repealing the Permanent Apportionment Act
and codifying the Cube Root Rule as the method to determine
the size of the House. Additionally, we recommend a public
education campaign to increase understanding of the benefits
of expanding the House and how the Cube Root Rule works.
Public knowledge will be essential to garnering enough support
for Congress to take action.

1. Why the Cube Root Rule is the Best Method
for Expansion
The Cube Root Rule is the most practical and beneficial method
to expand the House. The greatest advantage it has over the
other methods discussed here is that it is tied to the national
population; as such, it is a dynamic formula that is able to
respond to both increases and decreases in the population. The
Wyoming Rule only considers the population of the smallest
state, while the incremental approach and onetime expansion
are not necessarily influenced by population. If population
is considered under these approaches, it is only projected
population figures. The Wyoming Rule, incremental approach,
and onetime expansion are also incapable of responding to
national population decreases without additional legislation.
Because the Cube Root Rule automatically accounts for
population changes, Congress would not need to enact any
subsequent legislation.
There is evidence that the Cube Root Rule creates the optimalsized legislature with regards to communication between
lawmakers and communication between lawmakers and their
constituents. Furthermore, the Cube Root Rule would put
the size of Congress in-line with legislatures in other modern
democracies.98
Congress is deeply polarized and gridlocked.99 Unsurprisingly,
the vast majority of Americans disapprove of how it is
working.100 Large scale reform is needed to make the House
function how its architects at the Constitutional Convention
intended. Tying the House’s membership to the population
and allowing its size to automatically adapt after every census
based on a predetermined formula would make the chamber
more effective. Americans would receive better representation.
98 Government at a Glance 2017, supra note 65.
99 Mark Hay, Breaking: Congress Continues to Do Pretty Much Nothing, VICE
(July 5, 2018, 6:13 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ev8gbk/whycongress-cant-get-anything-done-in-2018.
100 Congress and the Public, supra note 54.
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Smaller districts would allow a higher proportion of the districts’
residents to meaningfully and productively interact with their
representatives and their staffs. At the same time, the Cube
Root Rule would allow the chamber to function efficiently;
it would prevent unwieldy expansion by eventually slowing
its rate of growth. And the automatic nature of the of Cube
Root Rule approach would spare Congress and the public
contentious debates over House expansion every decade. Such
debates might often end without any agreement. After all, it
was disagreement over expansion that stilted the chamber’s
growth over a century ago. The House must grow again, and the
Cube Root Rule provides the most practical and effective way to
make it happen.

2. The Legislative Proposal
The Constitution grants the legislative branch the power
to determine House size and apportionment. Thus, we
recommend legislation repealing the Permanent Apportionment
Act of 1929 and directing that the size of the whole Congress
be determined by the cubed root of the nation’s population
following each decennial census. Under this proposal, the size
of both the House and Senate would be equivalent to the cube
root of the population. This legislation should be approved in
time for it to be implemented immediately after the completion
of the 2020 census.
House expansion could be achieved through constitutional
amendment, but we recommend using a statute given
the urgency of reforming the House and the difficulty of
amending the Constitution. Over 11,000 amendments have
been proposed, but only 27 have been enacted.101 Passing a

new law would be easier, especially considering that winning
the required approval of three-fourths of states for an
amendment102 would be challenging when small states would
likely oppose House expansion.103

3. Public Knowledge and Support
Lawmakers are unlikely to address House expansion without
strong public support, and right now, that support is weak.
A recent study on House expansion gauged respondents
reactions to three objectives of House expansion: (1) decreasing
constituency size, (2) preventing loss of seats by states, and
(3) allowing for more women and minorities to serve in the
chamber.104 None of these objectives taken alone led a majority
of respondents to support increasing the House’s size.105 But
when the supportive responses across the three questions were
totaled, 55% of respondents favored expansion.106 These results
suggest there is room for large public support for expanding the
House if proponents rely on a range of arguments designed to
appeal to large cross section of the public.107 The nine reasons
for expansion discussed in Part II would be a good place for
advocates to start. Supportive lawmakers should address the
topic at town halls and in other settings where they interact
with their constituents. Members of the general public who
support expansion could advocate on social media and write
op-eds and letters to newspapers.
102 U.S. CONST. art. V.
103 FAIRVOTE, MORE MEMBERS, MORE VOICES, supra note 76, at 16.
104 Brian Frederick, The People’s Perspective on the Size of the People’s House, 41
PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 329, 330 (2008).
105 Id. at 332.
106 Id. at 332-33.

101 Eric Posner, The U.S. Constitution is Impossible to Amend, SLATE (May 5, 2014,
4:22 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2014/05/amending-theconstitution-is-much-too-hard-blame-the-founders.html.
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107 Id. at 333.

IV. Drawing Districts for an Expanded House
House expansion is an important step in returning to the
representative democracy the framers envisioned. Expansion,
however, is not the only step that should be taken. The drawing
of new district lines that would accompany an expansion of
the House presents an opportunity to address the widespread
and persistent use of partisan gerrymandering. In this Part,
we propose a second reform: the use of the primary allocation
method of districting.

A. Background
Gerrymandering is a practice as old as America. The phrase
“gerrymandering” dates back to 1812, from a political cartoon
mocking a Massachusetts state legislative district drawn
by Governor Elbridge Gerry to benefit his political party.108
Through the present day, gerrymandering has existed in
nearly every state in the union. For decades, the practice
went largely unregulated. The Supreme Court refused to hear
gerrymandering cases until its 1962 decision in the landmark
case Baker v. Carr.109
Baker held that a challenge to a Tennessee state legislative
district map, which had not been updated since 1901, presented
a claim the courts could decide.110 The state’s population
distribution had changed so significantly in six decades that
districts in predominately African-American urban areas had
ten times more residents than districts in predominately white
rural areas.111 On remand, the federal trial court in Tennessee
held that the districts violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.112 In 1964, the Supreme Court
extended the “one person, one vote” principle to the drawing
of congressional districts, holding in Wesberry v. Sanders that
malapportioned districts within a state were unconstitutional.113
The Court has also invalidated district maps that racially
discriminate.114
But these holdings have done little to prevent states from
continuing to engage in partisan gerrymandering. And the
Court has now ruled that partisan gerrymandering is beyond
the federal courts’ reach. In June 2019, the Court decided
two cases: one from Maryland and one from North Carolina

that both involved challenges to partisan gerrymandering of
congressional districts.115 The lawmakers who created the
districts at issue in both cases made no secret of their intention
to draw lines that benefited their parties. In the North Carolina
case, a Republican state legislator stated “I think electing
Republicans is better than electing Democrats. So I drew this
map to help foster what I think is better for the country.”116
But the Court held that partisan gerrymandering presented a
political question that it did not have jurisdiction to resolve.117
Its 5-4 decision asserted that it was impossible to create a
constitutional standard for determining when gerrymandering
was excessively partisan.118 The Court reasoned that regulating
partisan gerrymandering was best left to the state legislatures
and Congress.119

B. The Need to End Gerrymandering
With a solution from the federal courts out of reach, a legislative
solution to partisan gerrymandering becomes increasingly
necessary. Congress needs to pass a law dramatically changing
the way districts are drawn.
Lawmakers will always have a natural incentive to help their
parties through gerrymandering, while advances in technology
are going to make gerrymandering worse in the future. Voting
and voter registration data has become easily accessible, and
predictive algorithms have gotten better at forecasting election
results for proposed district maps, allowing state legislators to
gerrymander their district maps with more precision.120
Partisan gerrymandering has broad consequences for
America’s democratic process. The most blatant is the
disproportionate representation of populations in Congress
and state legislatures. North Carolina’s congressional district
map, for example, resulted in 77% of the congressional seats
being won by Republican candidates in the 2018 election, even
though only 50% of North Carolina voters voted for Republican
candidates.121
115 Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2491 (2019).
116 Id. at 2491.

108 ELMER CUMMINGS GRIFFITH, THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERRYMANDER 72-73
(1907).
109 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
110 Id.
111 Id. at 192.
112 206 F. Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962).
113 376 U.S. 1 (1964).

117 Id. 2506-07.
118 Id. at 2507.
119 See id. at 2507-08.
120 Jordan Ellenberg, How Computers Turned Gerrymandering Into a Science, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/opinion/
sunday/computers-gerrymandering-wisconsin.html.
121 North Carolina Election Results, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.
com/election-results/north-carolina/ (last updated Apr. 6, 2019).

114 See Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364
U.S. 339 (1960).
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Another consequence of gerrymandering, and our current
congressional election format in general, is that it dilutes the
number of “competitive” elections nationwide. This, in turn,
results in lower total voter turnout. In 2018, there were 86
congressional elections decided by ten percentage points or
less.122 That is less than 20% of all congressional districts. In
these 86 “competitive” elections, turnout was 16% higher
than the 348 elections decided by more than ten percentage
points.123 Voters have a greater incentive to turnout to vote
when elections are more competitive, and voters feel like their
vote has a greater impact on the outcome. If all congressional
elections in 2018 had the same voter turnout as the competitive
elections, there would have been more than 13.6 million
additional votes cast nationwide.
Gerrymandering also damages the country’s political climate
and public trust in democratic institutions. A lack of fair
representation causes voters in gerrymandered districts
to become less engaged in democratic processes because
they feel their involvement in politics does not matter. It also
worsens political polarization because voters of a minority
political party resent the majority party for diluting their
representation in Congress and the state legislature.

C. Recent Proposed Gerrymandering
Solutions
Several proposed solutions to gerrymandering have been
recently implemented or proposed by several states.

1. Independent Commissions
There are currently only six states in the country that draw
district maps using independent commissions: Alaska,
Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana, and Washington.124 All
of these states but Alaska appoint their commissioners using
a bipartisan method.125 Montana has only one congressional
district and uses their independent commission to draw the
state legislature district map.126 These states have 76 of the 435
congressional seats, meaning independent commissions draw
less than a fifth of districts nationwide.127
122 Forecasting the Race for the House, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT, https://projects.
fivethirtyeight.com/2018-midterm-election-forecast/house/ (updated
Nov. 6, 2018).
123 Id.
124 Justin Levitt, Who Draws the Lines, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, LOY. L. SCH., http://
redistricting.lls.edu/who.php.

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of independent
commissions drawing congressional district maps in
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting
Commission.128 The Court ruled that Article I, Section 4, which
requires the “Time, Place, and Manner” of elections to be
prescribed by the state legislatures, was broad enough to
permit states to designate districting powers to independent,
unelected bodies.129
Additionally, legislation passed in the House in 2019 would
require states to use 15-member independent commissions
to draw district lines.130 The Supreme Court has indicated that
such a requirement is within Congress’ authority.131
Independent commissions have not been implemented in
enough states for a comprehensive evaluation of their efficacy
and fairness. But in states where they are used, the results
are mixed. In Arizona and Washington, with nine and ten
congressional districts respectively, the congressional districts
won by each party in 2018 closely resemble the percentage
of votes won by each party in those states.132 In California,
however, the congressional seats won in 2018 do not closely
resemble the percentage of votes won by each party. The
Democratic Party won 66% of all votes cast in 2018 but won
87% of the congressional districts in the state.133 This is an
example of the flaw in independent commissions. While
independent commissions result in fairer districts that both
parties are happy with, they ultimately do not guarantee that
the results of elections will accurately represent the people
in those states. This is mostly caused by the first-past-thepost electoral systems used in most states, but independent
commission district drawing is still a tepid solution to a bigger,
more fundamental problem.

2. Proportional Districting
Proportional districting draws electoral districts and/or
allocates seats in a legislature based on the percentage of
votes parties receive in elections. This districting method was
first devised by John Stuart Mill in the 19th century134 and has
since been adopted in 87 countries, but not in any state in
the U.S. Proportional districting’s most significant advantage
is that it is much more responsive to the voting preferences
128 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).
129 Id. at 2673.
130 For the People Act of 2019, H.R. 1, 116th Cong., §§ 2401, 2411 (2019).

125 Id.

131 See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2495.

126 Directory of Representatives, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://www.
house.gov/representatives.

132 Forecasting the Race for the House, supra note 124.
133 Id.

127 Id.

134 See JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1861).
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of the electorate from one election to another. Proportional
representation would minimize wasted votes, uncompetitive
districts, and “would make it impossible for one party to have a
monopoly on the seats in a district.”135
The most common type of proportional districting, the party list
system, has large disadvantages. In a party list system, voters
cast ballots for a party and seats are allocated based on the
percentage of the votes each party gets.136 Voters cannot vote
for a specific candidate, only for a group of candidates running
under a particular party. Thus, the representatives sent to
Congress or state legislatures would not be geographically tied
to the voters they represent. It is important for representatives
to have geographic ties to their constituencies to help ensure
they will advocate for the needs of the people in the area of a
state they represent, especially if those needs are unique and
specific to that area.

3. Multi-Member Districting
Multi-member districts (MMDs) are districts that send two
or more representatives to Congress or the state legislature.
These districts are drawn larger than single-member districts
to accommodate multiple members. Currently, no states use
MMDs to elect members to Congress, but ten states use
MMDs to elect members to their state legislatures.137 There
are several advantages to MMDs. MMDs make it harder to
gerrymander and easier for third party candidates to be elected.
They also promote challenges to incumbents and increase the
ideological diversity of district representatives.
But MMDs raise constitutional issues and may not be
compatible with the Voting Rights Act. Federal law has required
congressional districts to be single-member since 1842.138 The
Supreme Court has not held multi-member state districts to
be per se unconstitutional but it has affirmed a preference for
single-member districts.139 The Court has invalidated MMDs
135 Douglas J. Amy, How Proportional Representation Would Finally Solve Our
Redistricting and Gerrymandering Problems, FAIRVOTE, https://www.fairvote.
org/how_proportional_representation_would_finally.
136 Matthew Yglesias, The Real Fix for Gerrymandering is Proportional
Representation, VOX (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policyand-politics/2017/10/11/16453512/gerrymandering-proportionalrepresentation.
137 Karl Kurtz, Changes in Legislatures Using Multimember Districts After
Redistricting, THICKET AT ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept. 11, 2012), https://ncsl.
typepad.com/the_thicket/2012/09/a-slight-decline-in-legislatures-usingmultimember-districts-after-redistricting.html.

for state legislatures when it produces discriminatory results
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting
Rights Act, regardless of discriminatory intent.140 Using multimember congressional districts would require a new federal
law, and might require an amendment to the Constitution if
they violate the “one person, one vote” rule applied by the
Court in evaluating gerrymandering violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment.141 Therefore, creating a constitutionally acceptable
MMD plan for Congress would be complicated and perhaps
impractical.

D. Primary Allocation Proposal
The solutions to gerrymandering discussed above have many
benefits, and each are preferable to most of the current
approaches to drawing congressional and state legislative
districts. However, as discussed, each proposal has drawbacks.
We endorse a new districting proposal that borrows elements
from each of the proposals discussed in the prior section.
Our proposal, Primary Allocation, would effectively end
gerrymandering, promote more competitive elections, and
increase the importance of each American’s vote in nearly every
state and district in the country.

1. How Primary Allocation Would Work
Primary Allocation would require two election rounds, a primary
election and general election. The primary election would take
place a few months before the general election. All candidates
would be required to declare for the election and with a political
party before the primary election. The primary election would
be open to the entire state, and voters would select their
preferred political parties, not candidates. Congressional and
state legislative districts would then be allocated to political
parties in proportion to their share of the vote. Each state’s
political party that received multiple districts would draw
district maps across the entire state for the general election.
With each political party having its own, separate district maps
for the whole state, districts would vary in geographic size and
shape and would overlap with district maps drawn by other
political parties. Political parties allocated one district would
have an at-large district representing the entire state.
140 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986).
141 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 558.

138 The 1842 Apportionment Act, FAIRVOTE, http://archive.fairvote.org/library/
history/flores/apportn.htm.
139 Connor v. Williams, 404 U.S. 549, 551-52 (1972).
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The candidates chosen to represent the districts allocated
to each political party would be determined by the general
election. The general election would have declared candidates
campaigning against members of their own party in their
corresponding party districts. Only declared candidates from
political parties that had been allocated districts from the
primary election would be eligible to run in the general election.
Similarly, voters in the general election would be eligible to
vote only for the candidates of the party they supported in the
primary election. Thus, candidates and voters who ran for or
voted for political parties who are not allocated any districts
would be barred from running or voting in the general election.
The general elections for each eligible party would happen
concurrently. With the districts allocated proportionately, the
population of each party’s district would be similar in size to
each other, but different in geographic size.

2. Primary Allocation in Practice
To illustrate how Primary Allocation would work in practice,
we will use a sample “State X” for examples. If State X has four
congressional districts, that means there will be five possible
electoral outcomes:
Democratic Seats

Republican Seats

4

0

3

1

2

2

1

3

0

4

With five possible electoral outcomes, the vote percentage
thresholds to determine allocation of seats in the primary
election will be divided into fifths:
Seats

Percentage

4

>80%

3

>60%

2

>40%

1

>20%

0

<20%

Suppose in State X’s primary election, the Democratic Party
receives 65% of the vote and the Republican Party receives
35% of the vote. The resulting congressional district maps for
the general election could resemble something like this:
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The Republican Party is allocated one at-large congressional
district, and the 35% of voters for the Republican Party from
the primary election will participate in the one general election
between the Republican candidates. The Democratic Party is
allocated three congressional districts, and the 65% of voters
for the Democratic Party from the primary election will vote
in the general election between the Democratic candidates
running in their respective districts. The Democratic Party is
free to draw their three districts whichever way they choose, so
long as the districts are roughly equal in population.
Suppose there is a third party in State X who receives a
significant number of votes in the primary election. If the results
in the primary election leave the Democratic Party with 50%
of the vote, the Republican Party with 32%, and the Libertarian
Party with 18%, only three of the four district allocation
thresholds have been reached by the parties combined, with
one district outstanding. In such a scenario, the outstanding
district will be allocated to the political party that is closest
to their next district threshold. Here, the Libertarian Party is
closest to their next threshold (20%), so the one outstanding
district will be allocated to it, with two districts for the
Democratic Party and one for the Republican Party.

3. Applying Primary Allocation to 2018 Election
Now we will examine how Primary Allocation would impact
political representation when applied to a real-world scenario.
The table below compares the results of the 2018 congressional
election by state, and how the results would have changed
under a Primary Allocation system.
The total number of seats awarded to each party would not
be much different than the actual results from the election,
with only an eight-seat partisan shift. However, Primary
Allocatoin would flip the party that controlled 66 congressional
seats across 36 states. This would change the congressional
representatives of about 50 million Americans.

State

Dem %

Rep %

Dem ‘18 Seats

Rep ‘18 Seats

Dem PA Seats

Rep PA Seats

Change

AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY
Total

41
47
50
35
66
53
62
65
47
48
75
35
60
44
51
44
39
38
53
65
78
52
55
42
43
46
38
51
55
60
58
67
48
36
47
36
57
55
65
44
36
39
47
36
69
56
63
41
53
30

59
53
48.7
62.6
32.6
43
38
35
52
52
23
62
39
55
47
54
50
57
39
32
20
45
44
50
55
51
62
46
44
39
38
31
50
60
52
62
38
45
35
54
60
59
50
59
26
43
35
58
46
64

1
0
5
0
46
4
5
1
13
9
2
0
13
2
3
1
1
1
2
7
9
7
5
1
2
0
0
3
2
11
3
21
3
0
4
1
4
9
2
2
0
2
13
1
1
7
7
0
3
0
239

6
1
4
4
7
3
0
0
14
5
0
2
5
7
1
3
5
5
0
1
0
7
3
3
6
1
3
1
0
1
0
6
10
1
12
4
1
9
0
5
1
7
23
3
0
4
3
3
5
1
196

3
0
5
1
35
4
3
1
13
7
2
1
11
4
2
2
2
2
1
5
7
7
5
2
3
0
1
2
1
7
2
18
6
0
8
2
3
10
1
3
0
3
17
1
1
6
6
1
4
0
231

4
1
4
3
18
3
2
0
14
7
0
1
7
5
2
2
4
4
1
3
2
7
3
2
5
1
2
2
1
5
1
9
7
1
8
3
2
8
1
4
1
6
19
3
0
5
4
2
4
1
204

D +2
D +1
R +11
R +2
D +2
D +1
R +2
D +2
R+1
D +1
D +1
D +1
R+1
R +2
R +2
D +1
D +1
D +1
R+1
R+1
R +4
R+1
R +3
D +3
D +4
D +1
R+1
D +1
R+1
D +1
D +1
D +4
R+1
R+1
D +1
D +1
R +8

Source: Forecasting the Race for the House, supra note 124.
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4. Effects and Future Elections
The most important effect of Primary Allocation on future
elections is that it would end partisan gerrymandering. This
districting method makes it impossible for parties to dilute
votes from the rival political party because political parties can
only draw their own districts. Parties could still draw districts
to protect long-term incumbents from challengers within their
own party. But all districts would be required to be similar in
population size and to comply with the Voting Rights Act, so
district map manipulation would be of little concern when it
comes to partisan and ideological representation. Coupled
with the proposed expansion of the size of the House of
Representatives, Primary Allocation will help elected Congress
members be more personalized and accurately representative
to the voters in each district.
Primary Allocation would also greatly increase turnout by
making almost all congressional and state legislative elections
much more competitive. The primary elections would be
competitive even in highly partisan states. Voters would be
highly incentivized to vote in primary elections because those
elections would determine how many congressional seats
their political party would be awarded for the general election.
Third-party voters would also have a strong incentive to
turnout because their party might have a realistic chance at
securing a seat in Congress. There are no third-party politicians
in Congress after the 2018 election; Primary Allocation
would likely change that and give third-party voters greater
representation.
Voters of all parties in all areas of the country will have much
greater incentives to turnout to vote in the general elections
as well. In 2018, more than 80% of congressional elections
were decided by double-digit percentages. The results of such
elections are essentially pre-determined before any votes
are cast due to the partisan make up of the districts. This
gives voters in these districts much less incentive to vote.
Under Primary Allocation, the partisanship of a particular
geographic area would not pre-determine the winners of each
district’s general election because the races would be between
candidates from the same party.
A concern raised by the Primary Allocation system is the
practicality of adding an additional election day for every twoyear election cycle. While the additional cost would surely be
worth it for the improvement over the current election method,
online voting could alleviate the increase in costs. Countries

like South Korea142 and Switzerland143 have already begun using
online voting, and West Virginia successfully tested online
voting using blockchain technology in the 2018 election.144
Recent trends point towards fully secure online voting being
possible in the near future, which would make holding two
election days per election cycle much more viable.
Another possible concern with Primary Allocation is its
constitutionality and conformity with the Voting Rights Act. Any
legislation to enact Primary Allocation districting should contain
requirements to comply with the Voting Rights Act relating to
equality in district population and representation of minority
groups. Although Primary Allocation would permit multiple
district maps drawn for each state, the format for drawing
these districts would be nearly the same as the current format,
so there is nothing about Primary Allocation that is inherently
incompatible with the Voting Rights Act.
There is also nothing about Primary Allocation that is inherently
unconstitutional. It complies with the “one person, one vote”
rule established in Reynolds v Sims.145 It maintains singlemember districts that the Supreme Court has previously
held it prefers over multi-member districts, and proportional
representation has never been declared unconstitutional. In
fact, proportional representation is more fundamentally aligned
with equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, so any
challenge to Primary Allocation based on its use of proportional
representation is unlikely to be struck down as unconstitutional.

E. A Legislative Answer to a Persistent
Problem
Legislation can be passed at the state and federal level to
implement Primary Allocation. But the political benefits
of gerrymandering would likely disincentivize many state
lawmakers from changing the current districting rules. To
ensure access to Primary Allocation elections in all states, a
congressional districting amendment to the constitution is
needed.

142 Tim Meisburger, Korean Elections: A Model of Best Practice, THE ASIA FOUND.
(Apr. 20, 2016), https://asiafoundation.org/2016/04/20/koreanelections-a-model-of-best-practice/.
143 Susan Misicka, Hackers Wanted for Swiss E-Voting System, SWISSINFO (Feb. 14,
2019), https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/intrusion-test_hackers-wanted-forswiss-e-voting-system/44753278.
144 Aaron Mak, West Virginia Introduces Blockchain Voting App for Midterm
Election, SLATE (Sep. 25, 2018), https://slate.com/technology/2018/09/
west-virginia-blockchain-voting-app-midterm-elections.html.
145 377 U.S. at 587.
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Conclusion
Each House member currently represents, on average, about
750,000 constituents. With an ever-increasing population,
this number can only grow. At what point is each individual’s
representation so diluted that he or she has no meaningful
say in Congress? At what point do the responsibilities of
over-grown districts simply become too much to bare for
House members? The 435-member cap on the House of
Representatives should not persist. The House should be
expanded in a measured, formulaic manner that responds

changes in the national population. Thus, Congress should
codify the Cube Root Rule as soon as possible to address the
multitude of issues that decades of inaction have caused.
The framers vision cannot be realized in the modern world,
however, without addressing the ever-present use of partisan
gerrymandering. Congress needs to allow for a new districting
model—Primary Allocation—in its elections. Only then will the
country have a chance of reclaiming the People’s House.
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